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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
plaintiff adopts the statement as laid out in Defendants' 
petition for Rehearing. 
DISPOSITION OF APPEAL FOLLOWING PRIOR HEARING 
Plaintiff adopts the statement as laid out in Defendants' 
Petition for Rehearing. 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT ON THE ISSUE 
OF STANDING DOES NOT CONTRAVENE CASE LAW, DOES NOT 
CONTRADICT RULE 56(e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE AND DOES NOT TURN UPON REPRESENTATIONS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
Defendants' contention that the majority's opinion on the issue 
of standing contravenes case law and the language of Rule 56(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and turns upon representations not 
properly before the court can only result from a misreading of the 
court's opinion. 
The majority opinion refers to the "issue of standing raised in 
the pleadings" and Defendants interpret this as meaning that the 
issue of standing is raised only in the pleadings and that, therefore, 
the court didn't demand compliance with Rule 56 (e). The issue of 
standing is indeed raised in the pleadings; but it is also raised in 
the affidavits of James Cunningham (R. 79-80, 89-90). Defendants 
apparently ignore thL' 1;1ajori ty opinion's statement that summary judg-
rn~nt is proper "only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
-1-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
interrogatories, and admissions of file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as~ 
any material fact ... " Having made such a statement, the court is 
obviously aware of the proper standards for summary judgment and 
it is fair to assume the court followed those standards. 
In their contentions that the "issue of material fact is not 
a product of the record but is founded only upon written and oral 
representations" by the Plaintiff's attorney (Petition for Rehearin: 
at 3), Defendants again have apparently ignored Mr. Cunningham's 
affidavits. Mr. Cunningham's affidavits clearly support Plaintiff'; 
contention that he and Defendants derived their titles from a co1ru1o.: 
granter. In his affidavit (R. 89), Mr. Cunningham states that 
Phenix Investment purchased the stock of Northcrest Manor (the 
corporation which developed Plaintiff's Plat E). In the same 
affidavit he also refers to himself personally as the purchaser: 
"After I purchased the stock of Northcrest Manor ... " This clearly 
indicated that Mr. Cunningham considered he and Phenix Investment 
to be one and the same or that he controlled Phenix Investment. 
He goes on to state that Phenix Investment dissolved Northcrest 
Manor and transferred it assets to Northcrest Investment (the 
corporation which developed Plat F) , of which he is the president. 
Without doubt, this affidavit (R. 79-80) gives rise to the issue 
of common granter and standing. 
In their Petition for Rehearing, Defendants also state that 
the case of Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781 (19 46), 
"requires that for one to have standing to enforce a restrictive 
-2-
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n: 
.o~ 
covenant 1vh ich is a part of a general scheme for building and 
development, one must be able to trace the covenant back to a common 
grantor (Petition for Rehearing at 2). That is not the holding of 
Hayes. Hayes held that if it can be shown that the original develop-
er intended a general building scheme, a subsequent grantee can 
enforce the restrictive covenant even against a grantee whose deed 
does not contain the restrictive covenant. The question of whether 
a common grantor was necessary was not raised in the case. The 
original developer, Douglas Heights Land and Improvement Company, 
conveyed several lots in the subdivision to Hubbard Investment 
Company. Some of the deeds contained the restrictive covenant and 
some did not. Hubbard later conveyed a lot restricted by the coven-
ant to Hayes and a lot not so restricted to Gibbs. Hayes sued to 
enforce the covenant against Gibbs even though his deed did not 
contain the restrictive covenant and even though the land was not so 
restricted when it was conveyed by the original developer; Hayes 
based his right to enforce the covenant on the fact that the original 
developer had intended a general building scheme or plan of develop-
ment. 
In his original brief, Plaintiff had made two different argu-
ments for standing -- one based on the uniform plan of development 
theory of Hayes v. Gibbs (see Point IV in Plaintiff's Appeal Brief). 
(Plaintiff also made an estoppel argument entitling him to standing 
which is not relevant to this discussion.) 
Defendants have confused these two theories, ignored issues of 
fact raised in Mr. Cunningham's affidavits, completely misstated the 
-3-
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holding of Hayes v. Gibbs and assumes that this court, in its 
opinion, has done the same. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT IS NOT UNDISPUTED 
AND APPELLANT SHOULD BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY 
TO INTRODUCE THE EVIDENCE WHICH WILL SUPPORT 
HIS POSITION. 
Respondents state that the transfer from Northcrest Manor to 
Northcrest Investments of the land owned by Northcrest Manor and 
not yet encumbered by restrictive covenants is sufficient to negate 
the enforceability of the covenants by lot owners who purchased the 
lots developed by Northcrest Manor. Respondents are incorrect in 
their interpretation of the law. Both in Hayes v. Gibbs and in 
the present case the original developers were filing restrictive 
covenants on the lots as they were developed and therefore lots 
which were developed at a later date were not yet encumbered by 
restrictive covenants. This state of affairs is not sufficient to 
break the enforceability of the covenants by the owners of lots 
which were encumbered earlier against the owners of lots encumbere: 
at a later date. This would obviously destroy the doctrine of 
"common plan of development" which looks at how a tract has in fact 
been developed in order to determine enforceability among the vatiQ 
owners of lots in a single subdivision. 
The Court's ruling that this issue was not proper for sununar: 
judgment is correct since the lower court did not afford Plaintif' 
the opportunity to show that a common plan of development ei<isteJ· 
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That such common plan existed is shown by Mr. Cunningham's affidavit 
which states: 
"After I purchased the stock of Northcrest Manor, 
r continued the development of the area maintaining the 
same name for the Subdivision and filing restrictive 
covenants like those filed for the portion Of the 
Subdivision already developed." (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 89) 
It is clear from the foregoing that the owners of Northcrest 
Manor did not consider the subdivision completed at the time of the 
purchase of the stock and that they did in fact complete it by main-
taining the same name, the same covenants and the same progressive 
tlphabetical denomination of the plats. 
It is therefore clear that Plaintiff should be given the 
opportunity to introduce the evidence which would prove his case. 
If Defendants are so confident that there are no material facts at 
issue, it is not clear why they are so vigorous in their efforts to 
deny Plaintiff his day in court. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS INTENDED TO BE THE BENEFICIARY 
OF THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS. 
Defendants confuse the doctrine applicable to determine what 
ct constitutes a violation with the doctrines of law applicable to 
·io determine who has standing to enforce the covenants. 
Defendants cite Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah2d 419, 336 P.2d 122 
(1959) (Petition for Rehearing at 9) to support their contention 
f' that Plaintiff should hu.vc no standing to sue because of the rule 
of law vihich requires that all doubts be resolved in favor of the 
fr,·r> 011rl ·inn::; r ri ctecl uc;c of property. 
-5-
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The rule set forth in Parrish v. Richards deals with the . 
issu; 
of what constitutes a violation of restrictive covenant but wa 
s nof 
intended to apply in determining who can enforce the covenants. 
r ~
should be clear that the two issues are separate and distinct. 
Parrish did not deal with whether plaintiffs had standing to sue bt: 
whether defendants had violated the covenants. Parrish v. Richards 
--.:;: 
sheds no light on and is not controlling in the present case. 
Defendants also rely on the affidavit of Mr. Cunningham to 
determine the enforceability of the covenants by Plaintiff (Petitio: 
for Rehearing at 8). 
To bolster their point that the intention of Mr. Cunninghamis 
controlling Defendants cite 89 A.L.R. 812 (Petition for Rehearinga: 
9). This A.L.R. annotation specifically states that the intent of 
the parties is to be determined by the documents and not by the 
recollection of an individual almost twenty years after the fact. 
The rule of construction, contained in the A. L. R. annotation is as 
follows: 
"Whether one not a party to a restrictive 
covenant has a right to enforce it depends on the 
intention of the parties imposing it, and this 
intention is to be ascertained from the language 
of the deed itself." 89 A.L.R. at 812. 
It should also be noted that Mr. Cunningham was not the draft~ 
of the covenants since they had been used before he acquired the 5 
of Northcrest Manor. 
ts wa' If, as Defendants claim, the sole purpose of the covenan · 
to protect lots uphill in Plat F, then it is not clear why the 
covenants do not state so but rather make no mention whatsoever of 
what the purpose of the covenants is. 
-6-
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If the logic adopted by Defendants were to prevail, it would 
also mean that in Plat F the owners of uphill lots could sue the 
owners of downhill lots but not vice versa. That t!1is was the intent 
of the covenants is certainly not clear under any reasonable reading 
of the covenants. 
Even assuming, for purposes of discussion, that the intent 
stated by Mr. Cunningham can be derived from a reading of the 
covenants, it would not follow that Plaintiff has no standing to 
sue. Mr. Cunningham did not state that the only purpose of the 
covenants was to maintain the view but rather the primary one. 
Obviously he must have intended the other purposes also. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT SHOULD DENY RESPONDENTS THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE ANOTHER SUM.~Y 
JUDGMENT. 
Defendants' request to be given another opportunity for 
summary judgment is inappropriate since the court has already 
decided that there are material facts which preclude the granting 
of summary judgment. 
Defendants are also asking the court to pass on the propriety 
of allowing the introduction of additional facts in order to obtain 
another summary judgment without providing the court with any legal 
support for their position. Plaintiff is therefore unable to refute 
arguments which have not been presented to the court. The lack of 
legal support for Defendants' position prevents the existance of a 
legal dispute. counsel for Plaintiff respectfully submits that the 
-7-
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I 
court should only answer a question when there is a legal a· ( ispute I 
and should therefore decline to answer Defendants' question. I 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of June, 1978. 
;;:;Nc:;a-:::n:::n:->N:T:o~v;;-i:r' n;::::;sl.:k"1'i--"D'-'.u::-:r::-:a::-:n::-d::;-o:-------- I. 
Attorney for Plaintiff I 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered two copies I 
of the foregoing to Anthony L. Rampton and Thomas A. Ellison, 
Attorneys for Defendants, at BOO Continental Bank Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101, on June 14th, 1978. 
Nann Novinski-Durando 
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